Naval Engineering 21st Century

CONSENSUS AND ADVISORY STUDIES

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Committee on Naval Engineering in the 21st Century

Presentations at Committee Meetings; Commissioned Papers

Meeting, September 30, 2009

Workshop: Examining The Science And Technology Enterprise In Naval Engineering, January 13, 2010

Meeting, April 6, 2010

Workshop: Needs And Opportunities In S&T Fields Supporting Naval Engineering, May 5, 2010

Workshop: Needs And Opportunities In S&T Fields Supporting Naval Engineering: Technology Push And Requirements Pull, June 10, 2010

Researcher Statements

Commissioned Papers

MEETING, SEPTEMBER 30, 2009

Survivable Ship Structures, Roshdy Barsoum, Office of Naval Research (ONR)
Computational Mechanics and Signatures, Luise Couchman, ONR
ONR Ship Structural Reliability Program, Paul Hess, ONR
Hull Performance/Undersea Hydromechanics, Ronald Joslin, ONR
Propulsor Hydrodynamics and Hydroacoustics, Ki-Han Kim, ONR
Ship Hydrodynamics, L. Patrick Purtell, ONR
National Naval Responsibility—Naval Engineering (NNR-NE), John Pazik, ONR

MEETING, APRIL 6, 2010

ONR S&T Processes, John Pazik, ONR

WORKSHOP: NEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN S&T FIELDS SUPPORTING NAVAL ENGINEERING, MAY 5, 2010

Naval Game Changers, Norman Friedman
Workforce and Education, Ronald Kiss, Webb Institute (emeritus)
National Naval Responsibilities, Kam Ng, ONR
Planning and Priority Setting for Basic Research, Kam Ng, ONR
Undersea Weaponry NNR, Kam Ng, ONR
Potential Technology Implications for the Navy’s Future, Ronald O’Rourke, Congressional Research Service
Science and Technology Challenges and Potential Game-Changing Opportunities, Michael Triantafyllou, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

WORKSHOP: NEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN S&T FIELDS SUPPORTING NAVAL ENGINEERING: TECHNOLOGY PUSH AND REQUIREMENTS PULL, JUNE 10, 2010

Researcher Perspectives: Hydrodynamics, Scott Morris, Notre Dame University; Krishnan Mahesh, University of Minnesota; Thomas C. Fu, NSWC-Carderock; David E. Hess, NSWC-Carderock
Researcher Perspectives: Power Systems, Robert Hebner, University of Texas; Steinar Dale, Florida State University
Researcher Perspectives: Structures, Charbel Farhat, Stanford University; Joachim Grenestedt, Lehigh University; Christopher Earls, Cornell University
Transitioning Technology to Naval Ships, Norbert Doerry, NAVSEA
Composites Road to the Fleet—A Collaborative Success Story, John Hackett, Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding
DDG 1000 Human Systems Integration, John Hagan, Bath Iron Works
Research and Technology Challenges and Opportunities (Commercial Ship Design Perspective) , Keith Michel, Herbert Engineering; Peter Noble, ConocoPhillips
Naval Ship Design and Construction, Paul Sullivan, USEC, Inc.

RESEARCHER STATEMENTS

Nine researchers supported by ONR submitted written statements at the invitation of the committee responding to the following questions concerning research opportunities:

What are the most significant areas of challenge in your field of research in the next 20 years? What are the hard problems in your field? What are the obstacles to progress in your field?
What directions or focus areas would you recommend for research investment in your field in the next 20 years?
What are the best opportunities for breakthroughs in understanding or for the emergence of game-changing technologies in naval engineering?

COMMISSIONED PAPERS
The committee commissioned nine papers on subjects that required in-depth investigation to supplement the information available to the committee and obtain technical, policy, and historical perspectives important to the conduct of this study. Each paper was prepared by a leading expert in the particular subject area. The authors were selected by the committee, and each author was given guidance by the committee with regard to questions to address and content to include.

Commissioned Paper 1
Examining the Science and Technology Enterprise in Naval Engineering: Workforce and Education

Ronald K. Kiss, Webb Institute
May 13, 2010
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to address the topic of workforce and education. The needs for a technically literate workforce and its supporting education system continue to draw the attention of national leaders. A common message has been issued by recent National Academy of Engineering studies, President Obama’s April 2009 speech to the Academy, and the November 2009 White House Educate to Innovate initiative: the nation needs to increase its attention to and involvement with the science and engineering education system and the professional development pipeline.
            This paper examines the continuum between the naval engineering education system and the workforce that is employed in that profession. A strong relationship exists between activities that attract talent, develop discipline-specific skills, and transition successful naval engineering graduates into the workforce, yet the links between these activities are not fully coordinated. While the naval engineering pipeline exists, there does not appear to be a single entity that is responsible for ensuring that national naval engineering educational needs are being met.
            The paper also explores the professional society engineering outreach programs and reviews the current state of undergraduate and graduate naval engineering education. The graduate-level review includes specific programs both in naval engineering and in related disciplines. It examines the naval engineering workforce itself and identifies professional development models and on-the-job training programs to attract, retain, and educate the workforce.
            The paper has three sections. One focuses on the undergraduate curriculum, the second on graduate education, and the third on workforce development programs (including engineering outreach programs, industry-specific training, and recruiting efforts to draw talent from related disciplines). The workforce referred to is that needed to meet naval engineering innovation, research, and development needs. Given the significant investment in education and training programs, proper attention must be devoted to retain these skilled graduates in the naval engineering field.

Commissioned Paper 2

Some Potential Technology Implications of the Navy’s Future

Ronald O’Rourke, Congressional Research Service

April 30, 2010

ABSTRACT

This paper briefly surveys some potential technology implications of the Navy’s future. These implications arise from the Navy’s future operating environment, the kinds of operations the Navy may conduct in coming years, and the Navy’s prospective resource situation. Each of these subjects is discussed below. The collection of issues discussed in this paper is not intended to be comprehensive, and the issues are not presented in any particular order.

Specific features of the Navy’s future operating environment that may have technology implications for the Navy include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following: adversaries with antiaccess weapons; adversaries with cyberwarfare and related capabilities; adversaries with nuclear weapons; terrorist and irregular warfare threats to forward-deployed Navy ships; limited or uncertain access to, and vulnerability of, overseas land bases; diminishment of Arctic sea ice; and policy-maker focus on energy use and alternative energy.

Commissioned Paper 3

Game-Changing Ships and Related Systems

Norman Friedman

June 14, 2010

ABSTRACT

Naval warfare is shaped by the vastness of the sea, which makes the movements of ships beyond the horizon difficult to know. Thus, relatively small groups of ships have exerted enormous impact, and until the 20th century, all naval battles were fought near important places ashore, because fleets found other fleets as a consequence of blockade operations. The vastness of the sea required large ships for long-range operations. Since those same ships had to come close to land to be effective, a second issue was whether small seagoing craft could tip the balance of naval power against large ships.

This paper is a study of the sources of innovation through the lens of history. Few innovators consciously analyzed the character of sea power and then set out to develop something earth-shaking. Some instinctively grasped the implications of what they were doing. In most cases it is difficult to identify an individual with what is, in retrospect, an obviously decisive development.

The innovations are categorized into three periods, which correspond approximately to types of innovation. The first period, before about 1900, was the era of inventors, of individuals who perceived a broad if unstated requirement and managed to meet it. The second period (1900–1945) was the era of innovation by large naval organizations, which could develop platforms or systems for specific new roles.

The third period after 1945 was different because cold war navies were far more integrated into national strategy extending beyond naval operations. Direct effects of naval operations against the land became more important because the probable enemy, the Soviet Union, did not depend on sea transportation. The advent of nuclear weapons greatly confused attempts to understand what the naval game was, hence what innovations were critical. The third period is the current era of system integration, in which payloads often dominate ship design in unpredictable ways.

The issue in innovation is always whether requirements or the innovator (or technology) dominates. During the interwar period, requirements pull appears to have dominated. World War II in effect demonstrated that technology offered new possibilities and thus was worth pursuing independently of requirements.

Overall, the paper takes specific platforms or systems as shorthand for large categories, such as amphibious ships. Some vital technologies cannot be traced back to individual game-changing ships or devices, such as mine countermeasures.

Commissioned Paper 4

Transitioning Technology to Naval Ships

Norbert Doerry, Naval Sea Systems Command

June 18, 2010

ABSTRACT

Transitioning technology from the academic and industrial research environment to installation on U.S. Navy ships is a complex process that intersects five domains: the science and technology community, resource sponsors, the acquisition and engineering community, industry, and the fleet. This paper presents both the current model and an alternative model for technology transition. The models reflect three drivers for inserting a new technology into a given system: filling a military capability gap, exploiting technology opportunities, and managing risk across a portfolio of systems. A discussion of how the different domains affect the processes is included. The paper continues with a discussion of technology transition challenges, provides technology transition examples, and offers recommendations to improve the process.

Commissioned Paper 5

Naval Ship Design and Construction: Topics for the R&D Community

Paul E. Sullivan, USEC, Inc.

June 10, 2010

ABSTRACT

The United States naval shipbuilding establishment has produced the best, most technologically advanced, and most powerful navy in history. However, the price that the nation pays for naval superiority has caused erosion of the number of ships in the fleet to the point that there are chronically insufficient resources to fulfill the Navy’s global commitment. The Chief of Naval Operations has stated the requirement for 313 to 324 battle-force ships. Yet the fleet hovers at about 280 ships, and this number is unlikely to increase significantly without substantial additional investment in new construction or significant service life extensions of ships in the inventory. The naval shipbuilding plans that could quickly bring ship numbers to required strength are unaffordable in the context of a constrained shipbuilding budget. Simply put, numbers count. Unless the overall cost of the fleet can be driven down dramatically without sacrificing military superiority, the U.S. Navy will remain short of resources to cover the need.

The biggest cost driver for naval shipbuilding is, in fact, mission requirements. Quality and high performance cost money. Battle-force ships will never be inexpensive. However, the shipbuilding community has the obligation to help the requirements community by instituting technology initiatives, process initiatives, and policy revisions that result in “game-changing” influence on the requirements–cost trade-off process. In addition, there are a myriad of issues driving shipbuilding costs that do not influence mission requirements, and the community could adapt them for all shipbuilding programs. This paper explores the needs for substantive improvement in shipbuilding costs as follows:

Cultural changes in the approach to requirements, ship design, and ship construction that could reduce the overall cost of battle-force ships;
Process changes and design tools that could substantively reduce the time needed for and the cost of designing and constructing naval ships; and
Technology improvements that can simplify and reduce the cost of ship construction and life-cycle maintenance.

The 30-year shipbuilding plan sent to Congress with the FY 2011 budget requires a pace of 12 to 15 ships per year of all types. However, the Navy’s shipbuilding and conversion budget for the past decade has provided only seven to nine ships per year. There is little prospect of the budget increasing in real terms, so the shipbuilding plan is likely unaffordable. The naval ship design and construction community must embrace many changes to give the Chief of Naval Operations options for building the battle-force ships required by the 30-year shipbuilding plan.

Commissioned Paper 6

Science and Technology Challenges and Potential Game-Changing Opportunities

Michael Triantafyllou, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

May 2010

ABSTRACT

The future of naval engineering in the 21st century will be shaped by novel and emerging technologies. These technologies will provide unprecedented capabilities but will require radical rethinking of naval ship and vehicle design. This change is already in the works as engineering schools in major universities are hiring young faculty trained in new fields and developing novel technologies. This investment is expected to bring radical changes to mature fields, such as naval architecture and marine engineering; hence it is necessary to prepare the ground now to reap the benefits.

The paper is structured on the basis of these emerging technologies and the impact they are expected to have, providing discussion of their impact on naval ships and vessels and their capabilities. Traditional mechanical engineering departments and naval architecture and marine engineering schools are turning increasingly toward nanoengineering, novel power trains and synthetic fuels, and robotic devices and smart sensors to revitalize mature disciplines.

A discussion of the implications of the following emerging technologies and fields for naval ship design is given:

Efficient power trains, especially of the hybrid type; efficient engines using alternative fuels, which are more sustainable and environmentally friendly; and fuel cells that use conventional fuels more efficiently;
Progress in surface chemistry allowing the development of novel coatings to protect ship hulls and cargo holds, reduce deposits in pipelines, and reduce fluid drag;
The all-electric ship, which has generated new methods for designing and operating ships with increased automation, reduced manning, and increased reliability;
New sensor arrays, which will allow sensing of the self-generated flow and will create the capability for active flow manipulation and hence increased capabilities for maneuvering and efficient propulsion;
Robotic developments that promise routine unmanned inspection and remote underwater intervention;
Smart autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) that increase substantially the operational capability of ships and submarines. Naval ship and submarine design will be influenced significantly by the need to accommodate the storage and servicing as well as the launching and retrieval of AUVs in rough weather;
New high-strength steels that improve hull protection against impact and fatigue, including operation in very cold climates; and
Global ocean modeling and prediction that will allow effective routing and operation of vessels in rough seas with unprecedented detail.

The paper closes with an assessment of the shape of future naval designs and the capabilities they will offer.

Commissioned Paper 7

The Future for Naval Engineering

Millard S. Firebaugh, University of Maryland

September 2010

ABSTRACT

In the future, a broad integrating outlook on the part of naval engineering leadership is imperative for success. Success will be recognized in the form of a U.S. Navy that maintains naval dominance at costs that are reliable and reasonable in the context of the many other challenges the nation faces. The U.S. Navy must nurture leadership in naval engineering by paying close attention to the selection of leaders and by providing for their education and experience. Broad knowledge and consideration of future trends across all naval engineering elements will be critically important in creating naval systems that can serve effectively and efficiently for many years.

The U.S. Navy is highly dependent on technology, faces much uncertainty as to the capabilities of the future threat, is entering a period of even more intense downward pressure on its budget, and must absorb new technologies from across the globe to maintain superiority. Therefore, naval engineering faces business, programmatic, and technological challenges. The Navy exists to deploy military force from the sea in the national interest. For the most part, the Navy carries out its mission in highly developed and specialized ships. The technologies concerning ships and the systems and equipment that operate in and from those ships are the province of naval engineering.

In this paper three themes are discussed: first, the importance of developing the individuals who are the future for naval engineering; second, the key business, programmatic, and technological challenges that will be important in future naval engineering developments; and third, areas of knowledge that naval engineering leaders need to master, beyond the usual content of formal engineering education.

As with most great enterprises, naval engineering for the U.S. Navy is fundamentally about people—their imagination, knowledge, skills, dedication, culture, work ethic, and vision for the future.

Commissioned Paper 8

Composites Road to the Fleet—A Collaborative Success Story

John P. Hackett, Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding

June 18, 2010

ABSTRACT

This paper traces the history of Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding—Gulf Coast’s (NGSB-GC’s) quest to bring composite materials to naval shipbuilding and the fleet. It will show the initial NGSB-GC independent research and development activity in composites, eventually leading to teaming with the Navy on major composite projects. Numerous small projects became stepping stones that enabled larger projects to go forward. Examples of composite applications that made it to the fleet, as well as some that did not, will be addressed. One example of a success, the development of the advanced enclosed mast/sensor system mast concept [its design, manufacture, test articles, and installation on the USS Arthur W. Radford (DD 968) as a demonstration] and eventually its implementation on the LPD 17 class of ships, will be discussed. Another case study, the DDG 51 Flight IIA composite hangar, a technical success that did not make it to the fleet, will be addressed. The high-speed vessel demonstrated the use of composites for the forward one-third of its 290-foot-long hull with its complex shape. These large composite structure successes made the next step, of a composite superstructure with embedded antennas and low observability, an achievable goal. The DDG 1000 class, with a composite superstructure, will become the first class of large U.S. Navy ships so outfitted.

Commissioned Paper 9

Human Systems Integration (HSI)/Crew Design Process Development in the Zumwalt Destroyer Program—A Case Study in the Importance of Wide Collaboration

John Hagan, Bath Iron Works

June 8, 2010

ABSTRACT

The paper reviews the Bath Iron Works–led human systems integration (HSI)/crew design effort in the DDG 1000 program, or Zumwalt destroyer, which was charged with deriving a highly detailed crew design coincident with and traceable to the hardware and software designs. The following are of special interest in the paper:

A description of HSI processes and tools developed or adapted for DDG 1000, along with lessons learned and recommendations;
The critical importance of collaboration, both inside the design team (intrateam) and with multiple outside entities (interteam); and
The importance of HSI as a component of the systems engineering effort (rather than treating HSI as a component of logistics or as a stand-alone activity).

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